Abstract-We document how imperfect information generates heterogeneous effects in information treatments with personalized high-frequency feedback and peer comparisons. In our field experiment in retail electricity, we find that high-and low-energy users symmetrically underestimate and overestimate their relative energy use pretreatment. Responses to personalized feedback, however, are asymmetric. Households that overestimate their relative use and low users both respond by consuming more. These boomerang effects provide evidence that peer-comparison information programs, even those coupled with normative comparisons, are not guaranteed to lead to increases in prosocial behavior.
I. Introduction
I NFORMATION programs are increasingly being used to encourage social and behavioral change. For instance, the formation of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in 2014 by the Obama administration put nonpecuniary, nudgebased information treatments at the forefront of U.S. public policy. Interventions that provide individuals with peer comparisons have enhanced voter turnout (Gerber & Rogers, 2009 ), rates of charitable giving (Frey & Meier, 2004) , retirement savings (Beshears et al., 2015) , water conservation (Ferraro & Price, 2013; Ferraro & Miranda, 2013; Bernedo, Ferraro, & Price, 2014; Brent, Cook, & Olsen, 2015) , and energy conservation (Allcott, 2011; Costa & Kahn, 2013) . These and other information treatments are popular because they are low-cost alternatives to politically sensitive regulation and because a growing body of research highlights their effectiveness in achieving policy goals. 1 In this paper, we provide evidence that peer-comparison treatments should be treated with some caution. Peer comparisons are hypothesized to work by moving individuals toward peer-group averages. Schultz et al. (2007) warn that although some individuals will learn that they are failing to meet the norm, others will learn that they exceed it. Individuals who underestimate their relative levels of prosocial behavior will potentially decrease their engagement in such behavior if shown peer comparisons. Schultz et al. (2007) further note that systematic overconfidence about relative prosocial behavior reduces the overall impact of such potential boomerang effects. 2 Intuitively, peer comparisons have the greatest impact in generating prosocial behavior when those who exceed the norm already know that they do, while those who are failing to meet it do not.
Although the literature on information treatments is extensive, few have documented the impact of pretreatment informedness on treatment outcomes. This paper sheds light on this issue using a field experiment with a novel two-step research design. We first run a baseline survey that elicits individuals' beliefs about their relative levels of prosocial behavior. We then randomly inform individuals about how their behavior actually compares with that of their peers. Then we track their levels of prosocial behavior over time. To our knowledge, we are the first to document how imperfect information about peer behavior generates heterogeneous effects in information programs.
Our research context is retail electricity, and the prosocial behavior of interest is energy conservation. Like previous interventions that we review, our information treatment provides peer comparisons, along with detailed information on energy use and energy-saving tips. Unlike previous studies, our treatment households receive this information through biweekly emails and a smart meter web portal with half-hourly updates on energy use. Previous interventions provide monthly or quarterly information through paper bills.
We focus on information programs in this setting for several reasons. First, behavioral interventions that inform households about energy conservation strategies and provide peer comparisons have been used extensively in electricity markets, yielding highly heterogeneous treatment effect estimates (Delmas, Fischlein, & Asensio, 2013) . This provides a priori motivation for investigating the underlying channels of treatment effects. Moreover, boomerang effects are a firstorder concern in electricity information programs intended to increase energy conservation. 3 Finally, high-frequency, highquality data on household behavior are available to explore treatment effect heterogeneity and its determinants.
Our paper delivers three main results. First, we find no evidence that households systematically underestimate relative energy use. Low-energy users are no more informed about their relative use than high users. In our sample of over a thousand households, just as many respondents overestimate their relative use as do underestimate. Most households think that they are "average" users, and high-and low-energy users symmetrically underestimate and overestimate, respectively, their positions in the energy use distribution. We check for overconfidence using a test derived from a Bayesian updating model from Burks et al. (2013) and find no evidence of overconfidence in our data.
The second set of results focuses on the extent to which pretreatment informedness generates heterogeneous treatment effects from our information program. We allow treatment effects to simultaneously depend on pretreatment energy use level, census block-level demographics, and environmentalism. We also account for other important factors such as potential differences in attrition between treatment and control households, mean reversion, and seasonality. We find a boomerang effect among households that underestimate their success at conserving energy. Specifically, households that overestimate their relative energy use subsequently increase their use by 6.3% in response to treatment relative to other households at similar levels of use. In contrast, and perhaps surprisingly, we find that those who underestimate their relative energy use do not exhibit a noticeable change in energy use in response to treatment. In sum, while we find symmetric errors in beliefs among similar numbers of households that overestimate and underestimate their relative energy use, we find asymmetric responses to treatment across these groups.
Going beyond our baseline estimates, we investigate how these heterogeneous treatment effects evolve over time. We find that the informational boomerang effect among overestimators dissipates after six months of treatment. This suggests a short-lived salience effect from becoming informed about peer behavior in our setting.
Our third set of results documents a second boomerang effect. Regardless of beliefs, households in the lowest quintile of baseline energy use increase their energy use by 11.7% in response to our information treatment, while households in the highest quintile decrease their use by 11.0%. In other words, after controlling for beliefs about relative use, lowand high-energy users both exhibit a reversion toward the mean following treatment above and beyond any regression toward the mean exhibited by control group peers with the same pretreatment energy use levels. Moreover, these energy use-based heterogeneous effects are sustained over our entire seven-month treatment period.
We offer a few explanations for this second boomerang effect. It could be due to household learning and reoptimization. For example, low-use households that learn through our information treatment that they previously overestimated the savings from certain behaviors (like switching off lights) may put less effort into regulating that behavior. Psychology may also play a role: Brehm's theory of psychological reactance predicts an opposition effect in response to information if households resent being told what to do. 4 Although we cannot rule out that an oppositional reaction drives the increase in posttreatment use among low users, the persistent nature of the effect suggests that households are reoptimizing. Making this distinction is important because reoptimizing suggests welfare improvements, whereas oppositional reactions represent psychological costs. To the extent that boomerang effects come from social or individual learning, information treatments may be welfare improving for households even if they increase overall electricity use. 5
A. Related Literature
Our main contribution is to the literature on information programs. Our study distinguishes itself by combining estimates of pretreatment beliefs with an information treatment that aims to correct these beliefs. More specifically, we innovate on previous studies that either document biases in beliefs without attempting to directly change them 6 or provide information without measuring baseline beliefsor measure only beliefs with posttreatment surveys-and yet interpret treatment effects as arising from pretreatment errors in beliefs. 7 Through our experimental design, we are able to directly study rational belief updating and show how pretreatment errors in beliefs can lead to unintended consequences of information programs. This paper also builds on prior studies of information interventions in electricity markets in two ways. Our focus on the determinants of heterogeneous treatment effects most closely relates to Allcott (2011) and Costa and Kahn (2013) . These authors provide evidence of how differences in energy use (e.g., high versus low users) and political ideology (e.g., liberals versus conservatives) predict heterogeneous effects from information programs. However neither is able to separate the role of imperfect information from other factors. Therefore, we contribute to the literature by providing a direct test of how imperfect information leads to heterogeneous treatment effects in electricity market information programs.
Moreover, we are the second paper to document a boomerang effect in electricity use and the first to identify one while accounting for seasonality and mean reversion. 8 4 By emphasizing energy conservation, our information treatment could induce such a resentment-based increase in energy use among all households. Among high users, however, this effect may be dominated by a conservation effect from individuals learning about how to reduce electricity bills.
5 Our analysis focuses on evaluating the effects of an information treatment on energy conservation; we do not undertake explicit welfare calculations. Although a common policy objective, energy conservation may not be welfare improving if, for example, prices are well above long-run marginal cost (Davis & Muehlegger, 2010) or if the costs of conservation outweigh the social benefits of reduced externalities (Allcott & Kessler, 2015) . 6 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), Jensen (2010) , Bollinger et al. (2011 ), Kling et al. (2012 , and Burks et al. (2013) . 7 For instance, Schultz et al. (2007) , Jalan and Somanathan (2008) , and Dupas (2011) , among many others.
8 Schultz et al. (2007) document boomerang effects. Allcott (2011) , Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2012) , and Costa and Kahn (2013) , who control for 512 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Why has a boomerang effect not been discovered previously? We offer two explanations. First, previous studies offered feedback at lower frequencies (e.g., monthly or quarterly) via paper bills. We provide information at a higher frequency, delivered using a technology-intensive medium: emails and web portals, usually accessed over smart phones. As a result, our treatment provides greater opportunities to learn about the cost of personal energy use. 9 Second, as Allcott (2015) documents, earlier electricity market information programs may have taken place in contexts particularly suited to generating conservation effects and not boomerang effects. Both of these explanations provide reason to believe that future treatments, which are likely to rely on high-frequency, smart meter information and involve less targeted populations, may also be more likely to exhibit boomerang effects.
II. The Experiment

A. Context
The context for our study is the retail electricity market in the Australian state of Victoria. Approximately 70% of Victorians reside in Melbourne, a city with 4 million people. Although the climate is similar to that of San Francisco, Melbourne is known for having "four seasons in a day" with both warm and cold air masses from the Outback and Antarctic affecting local weather. The average retail residential electricity price in the state is 25 cents US per kilowatt-hour (kWh). This price is high compared to the United States (10 cents per kWh), but low compared to Europe (30 cents per kWh) (Mountain, 2012) .
The state has retail market competition. Households actively switch electricity retailers in pursuit of lower retail prices and better service, with one in five households changing their electricity retailer each year. Upstream electricity distributors, in contrast, are geographic monopolists that pass on regulated network charges to retailers and, ultimately, households. There were five distributors and sixteen retailers in the market during our sample period.
Starting in June 2010, the market experienced major technological change with a government-mandated smartelectricity-meter rollout. Unlike traditional electricity metering which provides energy use information at monthly or quarterly frequencies, these new meters collect highfrequency, half-hourly readings of household-level electricity use. The mandate required all upstream distributors to install smart meters for every residential household and small seasonality and mean reversion, as we do, do not find boomerang effects. Ferraro and Price (2013) and Ferraro and Miranda (2013) do not find a boomerang effect potentially because their experimental sample excludes the lowest quintile of users in the population.
9 Allcott (2011) documents that monthly and bimonthly treatments generate 30% larger effects than quarterly treatments. Wichman (2017) and Goette et al. (2018) similarly find that providing higher-frequency feedback on personal use in residential water markets can generate large behavioral effects. business in the state by December 2013. Retailers had no influence over where or when smart meters were provided to their households. 10 Against this context, we partnered with an electricity retailer in 2012 to study the effects of providing personalized, high-frequency smart meter information to households. The retailer was a small player in the market with a customer base of fewer than 30,000 households nationwide. To engage households with their smart meter data, the retailer employed a third-party web portal developer, Billcap. Billcap provided households with interactive online home energy reports that provided their smart meter data in a simple visual format, along with energy-saving tips and peer comparisons.
Moreover, Billcap increased the frequency with which households engaged with information on electricity use and costs. Specifically, their platform sent biweekly emails that summarized households' electricity use and costs over the previous two weeks. The emails also prompted households to engage with their online reports. Figure A .1 in the online appendix presents a typical home energy report; Billcap's emails presented similar information to that in panel b. Prior to our experiment, households' main source of information on electricity use was their quarterly bill. The Billcap information treatment was thus expected to create large changes in households' information sets regarding the relationship between daily energy use and costs, and peer behavior. 11
B. Research Design
Baseline survey. Prior to treatment, we ran a baseline survey via email and a linked website to collect individuallevel data on home characteristics such as the number of rooms and residents, gas appliances, and air-conditioning. A key innovation of our experimental design is that we also elicited households' beliefs about their relative energy use with the following question: Using the beliefs data, we compared the quintile of the use distribution that a household believed it was in to the quintile it was actually in, conditional on the number of rooms in that home. 12 With this comparison, we identify whether a household overestimated or underestimated its energy use relative to its peers prior to treatment.
There are two notable points with the beliefs question. We intentionally included a middle, neutral response so we could distinguish households that commit to identifying themselves as being above or below average use. We also left the size comparisons vague (e.g., "as large as") to simplify the question and mitigate a perceived risk of household frustration by our partner retailer. 13 We invited survey responses from 8,564 residential households without solar panels whose energy use did not exceed 50 kWh/day. In total, 1,188 households responded to the survey (14% response rate).
Information treatment. We used a phase-in design to evaluate the effect of our information treatment on residential energy use. We restricted our sample to the 2,423 households with smart meter readings dating back to at least October 1, 2012. We then provided a randomly chosen subset of households with access to Billcap's biweekly emails and home energy reports in two treatment waves: October 2012 (640 households) and March 2013 (853 households). For technical reasons relating to the Billcap platform, we were not able to randomize based on survey response. In this restricted sample, 311 answered the survey (13% response rate). The 930 control group households were not eligible for treatment until June 2013. At this time, the retailer rolled out the Billcap service company-wide, which put an end to our experiment. Importantly, only treatment households received emails and could access the personalized smart meter web portal. Control households were not sent emails and were not able to access the web portal.
III. Data
In this section, we discuss our data sources and present some summary statistics. We also investigate two potential sources of sample selection bias in evaluating the effect from our information treatment: survey response bias and attrition.
A. Data Sources and Summary Statistics
From our partner electricity retailer, we obtain half-hourly smart meter data on energy use, as well as the exact dates each household starts and ends their electricity contract with the retailer. We use these data to track households' energy 12 Our results are unchanged if we instead condition on the number of residents in the home. 13 We emailed the survey to households at most twice and included a range of questions on household-level characteristics for our empirical analysis. This helped mitigate the risk that the act of responding to baseline surveys could lead respondents with different pretreatment beliefs to change their consumption in response to treatment in systematically biased ways. See Zwane et al. (2011) for evidence on how baseline surveys can in some cases modify posttreatment behavior in randomized control trials. use and retailer switching decisions from July 1, 2012 , to May 30, 2013 We combine the electricity meter data with data on household characteristics. Our baseline survey provides us with household-level data on number of bedrooms, occupancy, air-conditioning, and beliefs about relative energy use. In addition, we collect census block-level demographic information from the Australia Bureau of Statistics and match it to households in our sample. The lowest level of aggregation available is at the statistical area level (SA1) census tract, which typically contains 250 homes. Motivated by Costa and Kahn (2013) , we also collect elections data on the local shares of votes for the federal Green Party. These data potentially capture each electoral district's revealed preferences for pro-environmental information programs such as ours.
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for pretreatment electricity use and all survey and demographic data. Table 1 shows that mean daily pretreatment energy use in the October 2012, March 2013, and June 2013 treatment waves share common trends and do not exhibit statistically significant differences. 15 Table 2 shows some significant differences in household characteristics and census block-level demographics across waves. Households in the October 2012 treatment wave are more likely to live in freestanding houses with more rooms than households in the March and June 2013 waves. In addition, households in the June 2013 treatment wave have lower incomes, are younger, and are less likely to be employed full time than households in the other waves. These differences motivate our use of household fixed effects and posttreatment trends interacted with household characteristics and demographics in our regressions below.
B. Sample Selection
Survey response bias. Survey sample selection bias may be an important confound in identifying how treatment effects differ depending on survey-based prior beliefs on relative energy use. However, we find no evidence of systematic survey response bias. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the subset of households with smart meter readings dating back to at least October 1, 2012, by survey response status. Although survey respondents have slightly higher incomes and are older, respondents and nonrespondents have similar pretreatment energy use.
The online appendix provides further evidence of the lack of systematic differences between survey respondents and nonrespondents. Figures A.2 and A.3 show that there are 14 Billcap collects web use data that allow us to see whether a household opens an email. Forty-seven percent of all treatment emails sent are viewed by households. More than 80% of households viewed emails using smart phones. These data allow us to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) of households engaging with the information in their emails and home energy reports. 15 The first rows combine the data for the March 2013 and June 2013 waves because prior to March 2013, they act as a single control group for the first wave of treatment. The June 2013 treatment wave corresponds to the end of our treatment due to the company-wide rollout of Billcap. Means and difference in means in average daily electricity use (in kWh) between treatment waves are reported. Population of residential households without solar panels whose energy use does not exceed 50 kWh/day with smart meter readings dating back to at least October 1, 2012. Standard errors of differences in means are in parentheses and are clustered at the SA1 level.
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* * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. Population of residential households without solar panels whose energy use does not exceed 50 kWh/day with smart meter readings dating back to at least October 1, 2012. All variables that start with "Has" are dummies that equal 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise. Means and differences in means between treatment waves reported. Standard errors of differences in means are in parentheses and are clustered at the SA1 level.
* * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
no statistically significant differences in the distributions of monthly and daily pretreatment electricity use for the two groups. Table A .2 shows that there are no significant differences in observables among survey respondents and nonrespondents in the full sample of households who were emailed the baseline survey.
Attrition. The high degree of retailer switching in the market raises attrition as another potential source of sample selection bias because we are unable to observe households' electricity use once they switch retailers. Indeed, table 3 reveals that households that switch away from our partner retailer at some point between October 2012 and June 2013 are different from those that remain. Switchers consume more electricity, have higher incomes, are more likely to be employed full time, and live in areas where the federal Green Party gets more votes. Figures A.4 and A.5 in the online appendix show that the distributions of pretreatment energy use among switchers and nonswitchers further exhibit some statistically significant differences. All variables that start with "Has" are dummies that equal 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise. Means and difference in means between treatment waves reported. Standard errors of differences in means are in parentheses and are clustered at the SA1 level.
More important, attrition rates differ across treatment and control households. This difference can be seen by comparing the five-month attrition rate during the October 2012-February 2013 period for the October treatment wave to the attrition rate for the control group during this period. Of the 1,712 households in the control group in this period, 539 (31.5%) switch away from the retailer, whereas only 120 (17.3%) of the 575 treatment households switch.
To formally test for differential attrition between treatment and control households, we estimate a logit model for a dummy variable that equals 1 if a household switches between October 2012 and February 2013 and 0 otherwise. Our explanatory variables include an October 2012 treatment dummy, a baseline survey response dummy, average daily pretreatment energy use, and all the Census demographic variables. Our model also includes a dummy that equals 1 if a household has been with the retailer n months as of October 1, 2012, and 0 otherwise. In total, we include six such dummies for n = 1, . . . , 6. The estimation results imply treatment reduces the five-month attrition rate by 15.2 percentage points (SE = 2.22, clustered at the household level), which is 50% of the 31.5 percentage point attrition rate for control households during this period.
We further find that although treatment reduces attrition, it does so in a way that is uncorrelated with pretreatment energy use levels, beliefs about relative energy use, or demographics. The main predictors of attrition, other than treatment, are the month of the year and the number of months that a customer has been with the company.
Correcting for attrition bias. Although we find that attrition does not vary systematically among households with differing pretreatment observable characteristics, our preferred specification corrects for differences between our treatment and control groups caused by differential attrition using inverse probability weights (IPWs). Specifically, we first estimate the propensity scorep it that household i in month t is in the treatment group. For month t, we estimate a logit model for a binary outcome variable that equals 1 if household i is in the treatment group in that month. The explanatory variables in the model are exactly those from the attrition logit model just discussed. We estimate separate logit models for each month of our experimental sample and use these models to predictp it . With these predictions, we reweigh treatment observations in month t by 1/p it and control observations by 1/(1 −p it ).
Throughout, we report pairs cluster bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals, where we cluster at the household level (e.g., the level of randomization of our treatment). In total, we have 2,423 clusters. In this way, we account for potential household-level shocks and estimation error in implementing the IPWs. 16 Although our preferred specification involves IPWs, we note that our IPW-based results are very similar to results that apply no attrition correction (shown in table A.5 in the online appendix and discussed in the Results section below), and results that correct for attrition using Heckman's (1979) control function approach (available on request).
IV. Do Households Systematically Underestimate
Their Relative Energy Use?
In this section, we present results from our pretreatment survey. We look for evidence that some individuals learn 516 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS The prior beliefs are reported quintiles conditional on similar-sized homes from our pretreatment baseline survey. The actual use quintiles correspond to pretreatment energy use conditional on the same number of bedrooms. The experimental sample is restricted to households with smart meter reads as of October 1, 2012. If everyone knows how their use compares to their peers, the leading diagonal entries, in bold, would all be 20% and all other entries would be zero.
they are failing to adhere to a norm through our information treatment, while others learn they exceed it.
There are several reasons to suspect that households would systematically underestimate their energy use relative to their peers. Prior research finds that individuals either underestimate their own participation in undesirable behaviors or overestimate the extent of those behaviors among their peers (Kruger, 1999; Schultz et al., 2007) . More broadly, there is a wide range of evidence from economics and psychology suggesting that individuals tend to exhibit overconfidence, or "illusory superiority." 17 With respect to energy use, overconfidence may translate to a tendency to underestimate one's own energy use and overestimate that of their peers. Attari et al. (2010) document that individuals systematically underestimate the electricity used by most of their household appliances, especially larger ones. In a more recent survey, Opower (2014) , documents that most households believe they make more of an effort and are more successful at conserving energy than others. Table 4 shows that, surprisingly, households in our sample do not systematically underestimate their energy use relative to their peers. The table presents the joint distribution of households' beliefs about their pretreatment energy use quintile and their actual quintile, conditional on the number of rooms in the home. Panel A contains the full sample of survey responses, and panel B presents the subsample of households with smart meter readings prior to October 1, 2012 (our experimental sample for the information 17 See Svenson (1981, driving ability) , Gilovich (2008, leadership ability) , Williams and Gilovich (2008, intelligence, creativity, maturity, and positivity) , DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006, ability to commit to exercise), and Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) for an overview of the extensive literature on overconfidence. treatment). If all households held correct beliefs, each cell along the diagonal would be 20% and all other cells would be empty. Panel A shows that only 25% of survey respondents are correct. More than half (58.06%) believe their energy use lies in the 40% to 60% quintile. Simply put, most people believe they are "average."
A. Descriptive Statistics
Among the households with incorrect beliefs in panel A, there is an equal split between those who overestimate and underestimate their relative energy use. Figure 1 depicts this symmetry in prediction errors among high-and low-energy users. Figures 1c and 1b illustrate the prediction errors among all households, and for a subsample of households that believe they are above or below the middle quintile. Figure 1c presents the conditional distribution of prediction errors among households in the 20%-40% and 60%-80% actual use quintiles. In both groups, more than half of the households believe their energy use is in the 40%-60% quintile. A similar pattern emerges in figure 1d , where the prediction errors among households in the 1%-20% and 80%-100% quintiles are further accentuated.
When viewed from a slightly different perspective, the data reveal that relatively high-use and low-use households, on average, do better than a coin flip in predicting whether they are relatively high or low use, and they do so symmetrically. Continuing to focus on the larger sample in panel A of table 4, we see 59% of households at or above the 60th percentile believe they are at or above the 60th percentile. Similarly, 57% of households at or below the 40th percentile believe they are at or below the 40th percentile.
B. Testing for Bayesian Updating
Going beyond simple descriptives, we can formally test whether households' beliefs and their actual relative electricity use are consistent with overconfidence. Specifically, we implement a test proposed by Burks et al. (2013) . This TELL ME SOMETHING I DON'T KNOW 517 test looks at a joint distribution of beliefs and actual behavior at a given point in time and asks whether that joint distribution is consistent with an unbiased reaction to a history of noisy signals that contain true information about relative performance.
More specifically, the test derives from a model of belief formation where agents (households) are imperfectly informed about their relative performance (energy use compared to peers' use) and engage in Bayesian updating from a common prior as new information arrives from an arbitrarily defined signal structure (e.g., historical bills, discussions with neighbors about electricity bills). If households truthfully report their posterior beliefs in our baseline survey, Burks et al. (2013) show that for any signal structure, this Bayesian model has a testable implication for the joint distribution of beliefs and actual behavior: of all the households that believe they are in quantile k of the energy use distribution, the largest (modal) share of them must actually be from quantile k. This implication of the model can be directly tested using our data on households' beliefs and their actual behavior.
The test is based on an empirical allocation function, q k (s j ), that returns the share of households in electricity use quintile k that believe their quintile is j, where j q k (s j ) = 1. Panel A of table 5 produces the empirical allocation function across all quintiles for the full sample of 1,188 survey respondents. The testable implication of the Bayesian model we explore is q k (s k ) = max q (s k ) for all k; Burks et al. (2013) call this the diagonal condition since it implies the largest values for a given belief quintile should be entries along the diagonal in table 5. Panel A of table 5 shows that the diagonal condition is in fact satisfied for three of the five belief quintiles.
The test is implemented in three steps. First, we find the vector q = (q k (s j )) k, j that solves the following constrained maximum likelihood (ML) problem: Results are based on the full sample of 1,188 survey respondents. The empirical allocation in panel A reports for each pretreatment electricity use quintile k the fraction of households that report, pretreatment, they are in electricity use quintile j. The constrained-maximum likelihood allocation function estimates in panel B reports the solution to the problem described in equation (1) in the text. These estimates simultaneously best-fit the data while satisfying restrictions from the model of Bayesian updating from Burks et al. (2013) . See the text for details and the note in table 4 about the significance of the entries in bold.
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that is, we find the elements of the allocation function that simultaneously best fit the data while also satisfying the diagonal condition implied by the Bayesian model. Intuitively, if a given set of beliefs and actual behavior heavily violates the diagonal condition, the ML estimate of the allocation function and its empirical analogue will diverge, making it less likely the data are generated by the Bayesian model. In the second step, we use the ML estimate of the allocation function to compute the following test statistic, which quantifies the difference between the empirical allocation function and the theoretically consistent ML estimate:
Finally, we construct a bootstrap distribution ford by simulating samples with our q ML parameter estimates as per Burks et al. (2013) . With this bootstrap distribution, we can test the null that the empirical allocation function is generated by the Bayesian model. Panel B of table 5 produces the constrained ML estimate of the allocation function. The estimate is quite similar to its empirical analogue, which is perhaps not surprising given we find that the diagonal condition is nearly satisfied empirically. The corresponding test statistic ofd = 0.86 has a bootstrap p-value of p = 0.97, implying that we cannot reject the null that households' beliefs and actual relative energy use are generated by the Bayesian model. 18 We find 18 Notice that this test is general in the sense that it applies for an arbitrary signal structure that households form their beliefs on. The systematic individual-level prediction errors suggest this signal structure is quite noisy in our setting. However, given this signal structure, we find households' no evidence of systematic overconfidence in pretreatment beliefs that would otherwise cause us to reject the null.
V. Informedness and the Information Program's Effect
We now investigate how information affects energy use by interacting our information treatment with individuallevel pretreatment errors in beliefs about relative energy use. We hypothesize that households that overestimate (underestimate) their relative energy use will increase (decrease) their use once they become informed about their peers' behavior. In other words, we expect that correcting errors in beliefs will cause households to move toward becoming the users that they previously thought they were. Two prominent mechanisms emphasized in related literature on informational nudges yield these predictions. 19 The Becker 1965 household production model posits that households update their beliefs regarding the household utility-maximizing level of electricity use on learning of their peers' behavior. The Levitt and List (2007) moral cost model focuses on changes in the perceived moral cost associated with the societal impact of their energy use on the environment. Both mechanisms rely on households' reacting to new information.
Our analysis is developed in four parts, starting with suggestive graphical evidence that both pretreatment beliefs and energy use levels are important determinants of treatment effects. We then present nonparametric tests for the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity. Motivated by the graphs and these tests, we use regressions to investigate the sources of treatment affect heterogeneity and the extent to which treatment effects persist over time.
A. Graphical Evidence
Figure 2 plots average daily electricity use for treatment and control households between July 2012 and May joint distribution of beliefs and actual behavior is consistent with Bayesian updating.
19 Allcott (2011), Costa and Kahn (2013) , and Ferraro and Price (2013) . 2013 before and after treatment in event time. To create the figure, we remove household and month of year fixed effects and plot in each panel the corresponding difference in electricity use between treatment and control households in event time for months τ = −2, −1, 0, 1, . . . , 7 before and after treatment. 20 Importantly, each panel reveals that there are no statistically or economically significant pretreatment differences in energy use between treatment and control households. The panels also highlight common pretreatment trends in energy use between treatment and control within each subgroup. 21 Panels b to f of figure 2 show that panel a masks heterogeneous treatment responses as a function of baseline energy use. Following treatment, treatment households in the lowest quintile of the pretreatment use distribution (panel b) increase their energy use relative to other low-use control households that would otherwise have similar monthly trends in energy use. This graphical evidence is a first indicator that the information treatment causes an unintended boomerang effect. In contrast, treatment households in the highest quintile in panel f decrease their energy use 20 In estimating pretreatment differences in energy use between treatment and control groups for months τ = −2, −1, 0 we use monthly energy use for July, August, and September 2012 for all households in the sample (e.g., the three months before the first treatment wave in October 2012), as well as household monthly energy use for December 2012 and January and February 2013 (e.g., the three months before the second treatment wave in March 2013) for households that were not treated in the first treatment wave and who did not attrit between December 2012 and March 2013. For consistency and to avoid introducing attrition bias into our estimates, we similarly focus on nonattritors between December 2012 and February 2013 in estimating pretreatment differences in energy use between treatment and control groups for τ = −2, −1, 0.
21 Figure A .7 in the online appendix presents analogous plots that include pretreatment periods τ = −6, −5, −4, −3. These are estimated using households that are eligible for the second treatment wave. Like figure 2, these plots reveal no statistically or economically significant pretreatment differences in levels or trends of energy use between treatment and control.
relative to other high-use control households after treatment. The information treatment appears to have its intended conservation effect among this subgroup.
As per our discussion above, we ask whether this heterogeneity in program effects can be explained by the fact that low users tend to overestimate their relative energy use, while high users tend to underestimate it. Figure 3 sheds some initial light on this question. Panel a plots daily average energy use, in event time removing household and month of year fixed effects, for treated and control households in the lowest quintile of the pretreatment use distribution broken down into two groups: low-use households that overestimate their relative energy use and all other low users (underestimators, households with correct priors, and survey nonrespondents). Boomerang effects are present for both groups but appear to be somewhat stronger among households that overestimate.
Panel b of figure 3 provides an interesting contrast to panel a. Here, we plot daily average energy use for households in the highest-use quintile, broken down to contrast households that underestimate their relative energy use to all other households in the highest-use quintile. We find, as expected, some initial evidence of high-use customers who underestimate their relative energy use responding more strongly to treatment and conserving relatively more energy than other high-energy users. 22
B. Nonparametric Tests for Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Motivated by figures 2 and 3, we use regressions to formally test for treatment effect heterogeneity as a function of energy use levels and (un)informedness over relative energy AC, TD, BU, respectively denote all covariates, top-down, and bottom-up covariates selection for implementing the nonparametric test of zero-conditional average treatment effects from Crump et al. (2008) . The Chi Square and Normal columns correspond to the chi square and normal versions of these tests. See the text of Crump et al. (2008) for details on these tests and their implementation. For November 2012-February 2013, the test is implemented using all households that were with the retailer before October 2012. For March 2013 to May 2013, the test is implemented using households that were with Click Energy before October 2012 but were not treated in the October 2012 treatment wave. The Chi Square column is equal to √ 2K times the normal column plus K, where K is the degrees of freedom.
use. Before employing these linear models, we present two nonparametric tests that lend further support to our investigation into heterogeneous treatment effects. The first test comes from Crump et al. (2008) . They develop a nonparametric test of the null hypothesis that the treatment has zero effect for all subpopulations defined by covariates in the data. The test does not reveal along which dimensions treatment effect heterogeneity exists (e.g., pretreatment energy use, beliefs, or demographics), just that there exist covariates in the data that generate heterogeneous conditional average treatment effects. 23 In implementing the test, we consider the "all covariates," "top-down," and "bottom-up" specifications from Crump et al. (2008) . The covariates considered by the test are (a) dummies for each quintile of the pretreatment energy use distribution; (b) dummies for whether a household overestimates/is correct about/underestimates its energy use quintile; (c) a dummy for whether a household responded to the baseline survey; and (d) all the demographic variables in table 2.
The nonparametric test results for each month between November 2012 and May 2013 are presented in table 6. The small p-values in each month across all test specifications imply that there exist covariates in the data that generate heterogeneous treatment effects.
For our second nonparametric test, we compute quantile treatment effects. 24 The estimates for the middle 23 In the interest of space, we refer readers to Crump et al. (2008) and Ferraro and Miranda (2013) for discussion of the details of the test and its implementation. 24 Results from Firpo (2007) are relevant for the estimation of quantile treatment effects in the presence of endogenous sample selection. In particular, they show unconditional quantile treatment effects can be recovered if the data are reweighted using IPWs that predict treatment status. figure 4 ; the results are similar for other months. The results are consistent with the graphical evidence from above: households at lower quantiles of the baseline energy use distribution increase their use in response to treatment, while those at higher quantiles decrease their use. 25 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
C. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We now estimate the treatment effect of our information treatment on daily electricity use for household i in month t, q it . We do so with the following regression:
The treatment variable, T it , equals 1 if household i is sent the information treatment in month t and 0 otherwise. The α 1 coefficient corresponds to an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect since not all treatment households comply and engage with the emails and web portal. We allow for heterogeneous treatment effects with the next three sets of terms in equation (2) 26 For instance, if household i's Census block has average household income that is above the median household income, then the dummy equals 1, indicating that the household lives in a "high" income area. The dummies for age, employment, education, and Green Party local vote share are similarly defined. This specification of demographic variables follows Ferraro and Miranda (2013) . In practice, we codify demographics in this way rather than simply including the raw demographics in X i,d , as it yields a better model fit to the data. Our main findings are unchanged if we instead include the raw demographics in X i,d . pretreatment beliefs affect their response to treatment (α 2, j ), while allowing for treatment responses to simultaneously depend on a household's level of electricity use (α 3,k ) and demographics (α 4,d ).
Mean reversion and seasonality in energy use as a function of beliefs, pretreatment energy use levels, or demographics are potentially major confounds to the identification of α 2, j , α 3,k , α 4,d . To account for these factors, we allow for differential posttreatment trends in energy use as a function of pretreatment beliefs B i, j , baseline use quintile Q i,k , and demographics X i,d . We do so by including posttreatment indicators with these respective variables in the second, third, and fourth lines of equation (2). Importantly, we allow for differential trends following both the October 2012 and March 2013 treatment waves. The δ k,1 , δ k,2 , δ k,3 coefficients capture differential energy use by observable characteristics between October and February, while the γ k,1 , γ k,2 , γ k,3 coefficients correspond to energy use in March through May.
Finally, we account for household fixed effects and month fixed effects in all specifications.
Results. Table 7 presents our findings. Throughout, we report coefficient estimates from equation (2) multiplied by 100 so that the values in the table directly correspond to percentage changes in energy use. The ITT estimates in columns 1 to 5 are largely consistent with the patterns in figures 2 and 3. The pooled ITT estimate yields a null result from our information treatment that masks treatment heterogeneity. Our preferred specification in column 5 reveals that households that overestimate their relative energy use prior to the experiment increase their energy use by 6.3% once they are offered treatment. In contrast, the conservation effect following treatment among high users who underestimate relative energy use that we observe in panel b of figure 3 does not survive once we control for other moderators of treatment and heterogeneous posttreatment trends in energy use.
We also find important differences in treatment effects among high-and low-energy users. Households in the lowest quintile of the baseline energy use distribution have an ITT of 11.7% while the ITT for households in the highest quintile is −11%. 27 Robustness Checks. Recall that the results shown in table 7 include IPWs to account for potential attrition bias. Table A .5 of the online appendix presents results without the attrition correction. The results are nearly identical. Our preferred specification in column 5 reveals that households 27 For interested readers, we report local average treatment effects in table A.4 of the online appendix. In estimating the LATE, we codify household i as complying with treatment in month t if it opens a Billcap email and views the summary of its recent energy use and costs at least once in month t. We find a 7% incremental increase in energy use from engaging with smart meter data among households that overestimate their relative use. Low-energy users in the first quintile of the use distribution increase their use by 16.5% from engaging with their smart meter data. In contrast, high users in the fifth quintile decrease their use by 16%. All specifications include household and month-of-year fixed effects and are weighted by attrition-correction IPWs. Standard errors are clustered at the household level using a pairs cluster bootstrap that accounts for estimation error in implementing IPWs. * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. The treatment variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a household is offered access to the smart meter web portal. All variables in parentheses correspond to interactions of that variable with the treatment dummy variable. Omitted category is survey nonrespondents. The dummy variables for the energy use quintiles correspond to baseline (pretreatment) energy use quintiles. High Income is a dummy that equals 1 if a household lives in an SA1 location whose average income is above median SA1 average income for all SA1s in the sample. The other "High" demographic variables are similarly defined. See the text for details.
that overestimate their relative energy use prior to the experiment increase their energy use by 6.48% (instead of 6.30%) and that low users increase their consumption by 11.09% (instead of 11.71%).
One remaining concern is there might be time-varying unobservables that are correlated with attrition. IPWs, which are based on observables, would not account for these. To explore this concern we have conducted an analysis (available on request) in the vein of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) . We find that any omitted variable bias, potentially related to attrition, would have to be implausibly large relative to the impact of the control variables included in equation (2) on our coefficients of interest in order for our main results to be invalid.
D. Time-Varying Treatment Effects
Does treatment heterogeneity among households with different pretreatment beliefs and energy use persist over time? Figures 5 and 6 address this question. The figures plot the monthly treatment effect (ITT) by the number of months before or since a household was first emailed about the smart meter portal in event time. To construct these figures, we include a full set of interactions between three-monthsbefore-treated and seven-months-since-treated dummies and all the terms that include T it in equation (2), and estimate the time-varying treatment effects. 28 Figures 5 and 6 thus depict the time-varying α 2, j and α 3,k estimates from equation (2). Figure 5 again emphasizes the importance of pretreatment beliefs in influencing the impact of our information treatment. Only households that overestimate their relative energy use (panel a) exhibit a differential increase in energy use in response to treatment. However, the figure further reveals this effect is temporary and becomes statistically insignificant six months after treatment. One interpretation of this result is that becoming informed about relative use generates a short-lived salience effect among overestimators. We do not find persistent changes in behavior from correcting errors in beliefs about relative use that would, for example, be predicted by models of social learning. Figure 6 shows, in contrast, that the treatment effect heterogeneity as a function of baseline energy use is persistent. This is highlighted in panels a and d for households in the lowest and highest quintiles of the energy use distribution: after controlling for prior beliefs, low-use households exhibit a persistent 10% increase in energy use due to treatment while high-use households exhibit a similar-magnitude persistent decrease in energy use.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
What generates the patterns in figure 6 if they are not being driven by households' responses to new information from peer comparisons? The other important aspect of our treatment-higher-frequency and more granular information-may help explain differential treatment effects among low-and high-energy users. Relative to control households that receive quarterly bills, treatment households receive detailed, daily or weekly smart meter information at least every two weeks. Among high-energy users, salience may play a role by making costly electricity behavior more often front-of-mind. 29 Further, the energy-saving tips that 29 Another psychological factor that might influence our treatment effects is activation of self-identities. Confirmation that one is a high or low user through our information treatment could lead such households to increasingly act like high or low users. accompany the information treatment could drive some of the conservation effect from treatment among the high users in panel b of figure 6 .
Individual learning about how daily electricity use translates into bills may also play a role. Although households on average underestimate the electricity use of large appliances (Attari et al., 2010) , high users may also have previously overestimated the cost of behavioral changes that reduce energy use and electricity bills. Similarly, the sustained boomerang effect in panel a of figure 6 could be explained by low-use households learning that their daily energy use behaviors are less costly financially than previously believed. For instance, upon learning from their smart meter data that ensuring all unused lights in the home are always off saves them less than the cost of a postage stamp each week, low users may scale back their conservation efforts, causing a boomerang effect.
Of course, there are other possible interpretations of the boomerang effect in panel a. For instance, according to Brehm's theory of psychological reactance, a posttreatment increase in energy use could be due to a psychological opposition effect driven by resentment at being told what to do. Although we cannot rule out that a knee-jerk oppositional reaction is driving the increase among low users, the persistent nature of the boomerang effect suggests that households are reoptimizing in the presence of new information on energy use. The distinction is important: reoptimization suggests our information treatment is welfare improving, whereas an opposition reaction represents a psychological cost. To the extent that the boomerang effects come from social or individual learning, information treatments may be welfare improving even if they result in higher energy use.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a field experiment in retail electricity to study the impacts of an information program with peer comparisons. The key innovation of our experiment is that we elicit households' beliefs about relative levels of prosocial behavior with a pretreatment survey and then inform these beliefs through an information treatment. Our analysis delivers three main results. First, before seeing their smart meter data, households do not systematically underestimate their relative electricity use. Rather, most households believe they are average energy users, with high and low users underestimating and overestimating their relative levels of energy use at symmetric rates.
Despite the symmetry in errors in beliefs, treatment effects from our information program vary asymmetrically. We find that errors in beliefs regarding relative use can generate unintended consequences: increases in use by underestimators, a type of boomerang effect. Correcting errors in beliefs about relative use does not lead to increased energy conservation. The implication for policy aimed at conservation is that peer comparison information should be targeted toward those who are initially failing to meet the social norm, more specifically those who are more likely to overestimate and not underestimate their prosocial behavior.
Finally, we find a second and larger boomerang effect from our information treatment that is unrelated to errors 526 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS in beliefs. Controlling for beliefs, low-use households persistently increase energy use in response to treatment. At the same time, high-use treatment households persistently decrease energy use. While we are unable to confirm the mechanisms driving these heterogeneous effects, their persistence points to individual learning and reoptimization. Regardless of the mechanism, if the goal of information programs is to promote prosocial behavior, our results underscore the increasing importance of targeting information as future programs exploit high-frequency, personalized data and information technology.
